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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELMA ARLENE RAMMELL, : 
Petitioner-Appellant, : 
Case No. 
-vs- : 14618 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, : 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted following a plea of guilty to 
the crime of obtaining a controlled substance by misrepre-
sentation, fraud and deception. She did not take an 
appeal but later filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus 
was denied by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
after a hearing on April 29, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON Ail?EAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the decision 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 9, 1973, appellant plead guilty to the 
charge of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud or mis-
representation. This is a violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Section 8(4)(ii) of the Utah Code Annotated (1971, as amended). 
Appellant was sentenced to prison for a term not to exceed 
five years. She filed a motion for a change of sentence in 
September of 1973 (Case No. 25116) . No disposition appears 
to have been made of this motion. After approximately two 
years appellant was released on parole. Not four months 
later, she again committed the same crime, plead guilty, and 
was again sentenced to prison. She did not appeal. 
On the 8th day of March, 1976, appellant again filed 
a motion for vacation of sentence, Case No. 28575. That 
motion was denied by the Honorable Gordon R. Hall on March 
18, 1976. Later, on May 27, 1976, the appellant filed the 
present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which petition 
was also dismissed by the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM A FELONY CONVICTION. 
-2-
Appellant plead guilty to uttering a forged 
prescription to obtain the drugs Dalmone and Phenaphen. 
This conduct is proscribed by two sections of the 
Utah Code Annotated. The Pharmacy Act prohibits using 
forged prescriptions to obtain drugs and medicines 
generally. It was passed in 1953 as Chapter 17 of Title 
58 of the Utah Code. The Controlled Substances Act, on 
the other hand, is a more limited act aimed at preventing 
possession of certain specifically named drugs of which 
the above are derivatives. This later act was passed 
in 1971 as Chapter 37 of Title 58. A violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-14.13 of the Pharmacy Act is 
classified as a Class A Misdemeanor, while a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4) (iii) of the Controlled 
Substances Act is a third degree felony (see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-17-26 and 58-37-8 (4) (b)). Appellant was 
sentenced under the later law and now pursues this 
petition alleging that she should be sentenced under 
the lesser penalty. 
Appellant claims that (1) she should receive 
the lighter sentence since the two acts were passed 
contemporaneously and (2) that since the Pharmacy Act 
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was not cross-indexed to the Controlled Substances Act 
she, as a "citizen concerned with an understanding of 
the law" was not "provided [with] reasonably clear notice 
of the sanctions annexed to the commission of a given 
act." (Appellantfs briefr vPP-6--7^ ) Respondent submits 
that appellant was correctly sentenced for any one of 
the following four reasons: (1) The two acts were not 
contemporaneously passed. The later act which partially 
overlaps an early act thus prevails. (2) The Utah 
Legislature very clearly pronounced that the Controlled 
Substances Act is to be given priority over any other 
overlapping provisions. (3) This Court has said that 
the more specific provision (the Controlled Substances 
Act) should prevail over a more general law. (4) Appel-
lant is precluded from claiming (in good faith) ignorance 
of the instant statutes since previous convictions and 
motions made by her were identical to those now in 
issue. For these reasons, respondent submits that 
the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Appellant's only authority for her position is 
a misplaced reliance upon the case of State v. Shondel, 
-4-
22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), which was followed 
i n
 State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969). 
Like the present case, Shondel involved an 
overlap of two Utah drug acts with different penalties 
attached. Shondel had been sentenced under the greater 
penalty, but for two reasons, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
a three to two decision, held that he was entitled to 
the lesser penalty* In the first place, both acts had 
been passed by the same session of the legislature. 
Secondly, one of the statutes under which Shondel was 
convicted included the language: 
" . . . whenever the possession 
. . . of any drug or substance would 
constitute an offense under this 
act and also constitute an offense 
under [other] laws of this state . . . 
such offense shall not be punishable 
under this act, but shall be punish-
able under such other provisions of 
law." Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(g) 
(1953). 
The Court felt that "one concerned with compliance with 
the law" was forced by the last phrase of the above 
quoted statute, to go searching to find the "other 
i • • 
provisions." The Court held that because of this 
language, and because the two acts were passed at the 
same time, the defendant Shondel was therefore entitled 
to the lesser sentence. 
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Respondent submits that the Shondel case is 
entirely distinguishable from the present case and 
offers no-authority for appellant's position. 
(1) A later statute takes precedence over 
the earlier. The present case does not involve two 
contemporaneously enacted laws as did Shondel. The 
Pharmacy Act was passed in 1953 and the Controlled 
Substances Act was passed eighteen years later in 1971. 
As the Court in Shondel noted: 
"[There is a] generally 
recognized rule that where there 
is conflict between two legislative 
acts the latest will ordinarily 
prevail." 453 P.2d at 147. 
Thus, if the facts in Shondel had been as they are in 
the instant case, Shondel would have gone the other way. 
Appellant, however, would argue that since the 
penalty involved in the Pharmacy Act was increased in 
1971, the entire act is renovated and thus retroactively 
made contemporaneous with the Controlled Substances Act. 
Respondent, finding no pertinent authority, and noting 
that appellant has also failed in such an offer, expresses 
doubt that an increment in penalty weight can have such 
an effect. In any case, the issue is of mere academic 
interest since other facts sufficiently resolve the 
primary question. 
~6-
(2) The legislature clearly designated the 
statute that is to take precedence* In Shondel, the 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
" [If] both statutes were 
passed at the same session of 
the legislature . . .the rule 
that the later act takes precedence 
over the former has no application 
unless there is a clearly-expressed 
intention to that effect." 453 
P.2d at 147. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Controlled Substances' Act takes 
precedence over the Pharmacy Act by reason of its 
later date of enactment,. and^it also .jmanifests 
a "clearly-expressed intention to that effect," by 
the Utah Legislature. This legislative intent was 
specifically set out and made crystal clear by Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-19, the closing paragraph of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act: 
"It is the purpose of this act 
to regulate and control the substances 
designated within section 58-37-4, and 
whenever the . . . penalties imposed, 
relating to substances controlled by 
this act shall be or appear to be in 
conflict with . . . any other laws of 
this state, the provisions of this 
act shall be controlling." (Emphasis 
added.) 
(3) The more specific act should prevail over 
the more general. There is an additional rule of statutory 
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interpretation which precludes appellant's interpreta-
tion of the law. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld the rule that when two statutes conflict or 
overlap, the more specific statute takes precedence 
over that which is more general. See Bateman v. Board 
of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1957), and 
Pacific Intermountain Express v. State Tax Commission, 
7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957). This position is 
widely if not universally followed in both criminal 
and civil cases. See State v. Rice, 516 P.2d 1222 
(Ariz. 1973); People v. Gilbert, 462 P.2d 580 (Cal. 
1969); State v. Beckman, 368 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1962); 
In re Smart, 505 P.2d 1179 (Hawaii 1973); and State v. 
Roderick, 375 P.2d 1005 (Idaho 1962). 
Applying this rule to the two statutes here 
involved, it is obvious that the Controlled Substances 
Act is more specific and thus the controlling law in 
this case. The Pharmacy Act deals broadly with the 
procedures for operating a pharmaceutical enterprise 
in the State of Utah. The section in question, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-17-14.13 merely provides, in general 
terms, that it is illegal to use fraud or deception 
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to obtain any drugs or medicines from a pharmacy. The 
Controlled Substances Act, on the other hand, is aimed 
at controlling the acquisition, possession and use of 
a specifically designated group of compounds. In other 
words, whereas the Pharmacy Act is directed to all drugs 
and medicines, the Controlled Substances Act carves out 
selected drugs or substances that are more dangerous and 
which are more subject to abuse. The differing penalties 
reflect the purposes of the acts. For example, a forgery 
of a prescription for birth control pills or penicillin 
would violate the Pharmacy Act, but not the more narrow 
scope of the Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, the 
law provides that appellant should be sentenced under the 
felony provision in the instant case, because of the 
controlled substances obtained. 
(4) Appellant is precluded from claiming 
ignorance since she previously filed motions which contradict 
such an allegation. In Shoridel, one of the overlapping 
provisions said: 
" . . . whenever the possession 
. . . of any drug or substance would 
constitute an offense under this 
act and also constitute an offense 
under [other] laws of this state 
. . . such offense shall not be 
punishable under this act, but shall 
be punishable under such other provision 
of law." Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (g). 
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The Utah Supreme Court held that "one concerned with 
compliance with the law" was forced, by the last 
phrase of the above statute, to search elsewhere to 
find some "other provision of law." The Court held 
that a statute should be sufficiently clear so that a 
person who desired to obey the law would know how to 
conform to the law and what punishment might be imposed 
for nonconformance. 22 Utah 2d at 346. Appellant argues 
that she was ignorant of the supposed conflicting provisions 
of the law and thus should receive her punishment under 
the lesser provision. The 1973 motion precludes this 
position. Obviously at the time of the arraignment for 
the second offense, she was fully aware of the claims she 
now makes. In the present case, the statute is very dif-
ferent from that in Shondel, for it says: 
". . . whenever the . . . 
penalties imposed. . . shall be 
or appear to be in conflict with 
. . . any other laws of this state, 
the provisions of this act shall be 
controlling." Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-19. (Emphasis added.) 
Obviously, nobody is sent searching for the proper penalty. 
Appellant was first convicted in 1973 of 
obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation. 
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She thereafter filed a motion for change of that 
sentence in 1973, a copy of which is hereto appended. 
That motion shows thai- she was aware of the Pharmacy 
Act as well as the Controlled Substances Act as 
early as 1973, since that motion raised the same 
points as are argued here. Thereafter, knowing 
full well the possible penalties, and only four 
months after being placed on parole for her 
earlier crime, appellant again, in 1975, committed 
the same crime of obtaining a controlled substance 
by misrepresenation. 
POINT II 
HABEAS CORPUS IS IMPROPER IN THIS CASE. 
This Court has repeatedly expressed its 
concern over the increased use of habeas corpus writs 
as substitutes for timely appeal proceedings. See 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968); 
and Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34 
(1972). A substantial line of cases state quite 
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clearly that matters which were known or should have 
been known by counsel and defendant at the time of 
trial should have been disposed of by the regular 
appellate procedure. Brown, supra, and Johnson v. 
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970). This 
Court has universally held that appeal is the regular 
procedure for review of injustices and irregularities 
in lower court proceedings* 
This Court has recognized that there is a 
limited exception to the above rules. As the Court 
said in Johnson v. Turner, supra at page 904: 
"Where it appears that 
there has been such a miscarriage 
of justice that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine 
a conviction, and that for some 
justifiable reason an appeal was 
not taken thereon, we do not regard 
rules of procedure as being so 
absolute as to prevent us from 
correcting any such obvious 
injustice." 
Thus, the Court has laid out a two-pronged test for 
determining the justifiability of a habeas corpus 
petition. First, there must be an "unconscionable 
miscarriage of justice," and second, there must be 
some "justifiable reason" for not taking an appeal 
-12-
Appellant strenuously urges that a miscarriage 
of justice has taken place in that she received an improper 
sentence. Respondent has shown, however, that the sentence 
was proper. Therefore, appellant fails in the first part 
of the test. As for the second prong, appellant not only 
fails to meet that requirement, she does not even try. 
There is not one word in appellant's brief to justify the 
fact that she did not file a timely appeal in this matter, 
nor did she interpose an objection to the charge or penalty 
for her second offense, notwithstanding her 1973 motion. 
Therefore, since there is no showing of a "justifiable 
reason" for not taking an appeal, and since appellant's 
attempt at proving an "unconscionable miscarriage" has 
failed, the decisions line up against her and require that 
the present petition be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respect-
fully requests that the judgment of the lower court be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Judge, this 9th March, 1973 for the passing of sentence upon the within named 
defendant. The defendant appearing in person and being represented by SEan 
Sntedley, as counsel, Assistant County Attorney, Don Sawaya, Appearing in behalf 
of the State, a3 counsel* Whereupon, the defendant Is asked is she has any legal can 
to why sentence should not be passed upon her, the defendant answering that 
she has none, the Judgment and sentence of this Court is pronounced as follows, to-
witt 
"It is the judgment and sentence of this 
Court that you Arlene Rammell be confined 
and iirprisoned in the Utah State Prison for 
the Indeterminate terra (0 to 5 years) as 
provided by law for the crime of Obtaining 
a controlled substance by Fraud and Fined 
$300.00." 
The defendant is granted a stay of execution of sentence to March 30, 1973 
and the matter is referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department. 
April 6, 1973: 
The defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date, 
defendant appearing in person and being represented by Stan Smedley, as counsel; 
Assistant County Attorney, Don Sawaya, appearing ia behalf of the State. Now upoc 
the Court's own motion and good cause appearing therefore, it is ordered that 
the defendant be granted no further stay of execution of sentence and that a 
commitment to issue forthwith in accordance with the sentence and Judgment previously 
ordered. 
And, you Delmar Larson, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah are hereby commanded to 
take the said Arlene Rammell and deliver her without delay to the Utah State 
Prison, then and there to be confined in accordance with the commitment heratofore 
imposed. 
Isauedi Friday, April 6, 1973. 
